Abstract knowledge in the broken-string problem : evidence from nonhuman primates and pre-schoolers by Mayer, Carolina Patricia et al.
Abstract Knowledge in the Broken-String Problem:
Evidence from Nonhuman Primates and Pre-Schoolers
Carolina Mayer1*, Josep Call1,2, Anna Albiach-Serrano2,3, Elisabetta Visalberghi4, Gloria Sabbatini4,
Amanda Seed1,2
1University of St Andrews, School of Psychology and Neuroscience, St Andrews, Fife, Scotland, United Kingdom, 2Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology,
Department of Comparative and Developmental Psychology, Leipzig, Germany, 3 Ethology and Animal Welfare Section, Universidad CEU Cardenal Herrera, Valencia,
Spain, 4Unit of Cognitive Primatology and Primate Centre, Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Roma, Italy
Abstract
There is still large controversy about whether abstract knowledge of physical problems is uniquely human. We presented 9
capuchin monkeys, 6 bonobos, 6 chimpanzees and 48 children with two versions of a broken-string problem. In the
standard condition, participants had to choose between an intact and a broken string as means to a reward. In the critical
condition, the functional parts of the strings were covered up and replaced by perceptually similar, but non-functional cues.
Apes, monkeys and young children performed significantly better in the standard condition in which the cues played a
functional role, indicating knowledge of the functional properties involved. Moreover, a control experiment with
chimpanzees and young children ruled out that this difference in performance could be accounted for by differences of
perceptual feedback in the two conditions. We suggest that, similar to humans, nonhuman primates partly rely on abstract
concepts in physical problem-solving.
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Introduction
Adult humans rely on the abstract representation of objects’
physical properties in their daily problem-solving. Although
several other animal species can use tools to solve problems
[1,2], the nature of their object representations is a matter of
intense debate. For example, having learned to pull an intact
object rather than a broken one to bring food within reach,
chimpanzees, capuchin monkeys and cotton-top tamarins trans-
ferred the solution across tasks that varied the tools’ shape and
position [3–9]. It is possible that the primates have abstract
knowledge of object properties such as connectivity or continuity
[5,6]. Alternatively, however, they might have generalised the
solution using a perceptual metric common to all of the tasks (e.g.
avoid a gap between two parts of a tool). It is difficult to tease apart
these two explanations based only on successful transfers, since
both strategies would enable subjects to solve all problems in
which the same perceptual features are discriminatory [9]. To
date, the notion that any non-human animals go beyond
perceptual features of objects to represent their abstract physical
properties remains contentious [10], though see [11,12].
We aimed to overcome these limitations by comparing the
performance of bonobos, chimpanzees and tufted capuchin
monkeys on two versions of a broken-string problem. All three
species are known to solve a variety of tasks that require them to
discriminate between two or three tools [3,13–17]. We also tested
children between 2K and 6K years of age to gain insight into the
development of using object properties and arbitrary cues to solve
problems.
In the standard, ‘uncovered’ version of the task, a reward was
tied to each of two strings, one complete and one broken in two
parts with a gap between the two. In the ‘covered’ version, the
central parts of the strings were obscured by a cover; although the
rewards at the far end of the strings were visible. A broken and an
unbroken string were stuck to the cover in the same positions as
their real counterparts beneath.
The ‘covered’ and the ‘uncovered’ conditions were perceptually
very similar. A subject could use the appearance of the strings (i.e.,
with and without a gap) to choose (pull or touch) the correct
alternative (the string that could bring the food into reach) (see
figure 1). Moreover, in both conditions, the movement of the
reward at the end of the table could immediately be perceived by
subjects choosing the unbroken string, so there was similar visual
reinforcement. Therefore, relating perceptual features to the
outcome would lead subjects to solve both conditions equally
well. However, the physical connection between the unbroken
string and the reward could only be seen in the ‘uncovered’
condition; as the strings moved after they had been chosen. In
contrast, the cues on the cover in the ‘covered’ condition did not
move.
This approach allowed us to test the hypothesis that nonhuman
primates rely on perceptual cues alone when discriminating
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between two tools in a means-end task: if subjects only respond to
the perceptual pattern of the problem, they should perform
equally well in both the ‘covered’ and ‘uncovered’ condition. In
contrast, if subjects have knowledge of the functional properties of
the problem (i.e., the gap in the string prevents you from pulling in
the reward), one would predict better performance in the
‘uncovered’ condition in which the strings play a functional role.
Experiment 1: Nonhuman Primates
Participants
We tested 6 chimpanzees (4 females) and 6 bonobos (3 females)
at the Wolfgang Ko¨hler Primate Research Centre (WKPRC) at
the Leipzig Zoo, Germany, between March and August 2008 (age
range = 3–31 years). Chimpanzees at the WKPRC live in two
cohesive groups ranging from 6 to 17 individuals. The groups are
housed in separate ,4000 m2 outdoor areas, and ,400 m2 indoor
areas, which have natural vegetation, climbing structures, trees,
streams and other natural features, as well as enrichment facilities
such as spinning treat logs and artificial termite mounds. At night
they stay in a series of sleeping rooms (about 47 m2). The
chimpanzees are fed a variety of fruits, vegetables and cereals
several times per day. The subjects are never food deprived and
water is available ad libitum. Individual ages can be found in S1.
All of the apes had previous experience with a number of problems
involving tools (including strings); both in their enriched captive
environment, as well as in previous experiments. Chimpanzees
were tested individually in an on-show observation room, and
bonobos in their sleeping rooms. Subjects were tested on
consecutive days as far as possible, with no more than 7 days
between testing days. Research at the WKPRC was performed in
accordance with the recommendations of the Weatherall report
‘‘The use of non-human primates in research’’. Research was non-
invasive and strictly adhered to legal requirements in Germany.
The study was ethically approved by an internal committee at the
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology. Animal
husbandry and research comply with the ‘‘EAZA Minimum
Standards for the Accommodation and Care of Animals in Zoos
and Aquaria’’, the ‘‘WAZA Ethical Guidelines for the Conduct of
Research on Animals by Zoos and Aquariums’’ and the
‘‘Guidelines for the Treatment of Animals in Behavioral Research
and Teaching’’ of the Association for the Study of Animal
Behavior (ASAB).
We also tested 9 capuchin monkeys (4 females) at the Primate
Center of the Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies,
CNR in Rome (Italy) between February and June 2013 (age
range = 3–29 years). Capuchin monkeys at the CNR are held in
four separated groups ranging from 5 to 11 individuals. The
groups are housed in enclosures consisting of an outdoor area
ranging from ,19.4 m2 to ,126.8 m2 with natural vegetation
and climbing structures and two ,8.7 m2 indoor cages. Similar to
the apes, none of the monkeys are ever food deprived, but fed
monkey chow (Altromin-A pellets, Rieper standard diet for
primates), fruits and vegetables each day according to their diet.
Water is available ad libitum. Individual ages can be found in S1.
All capuchin monkeys had previous experience with a number of
problems involving tools (but not with string tasks). Capuchins
were tested individually in the indoor area. Testing took place a
maximum of 5 times a week, with no more than 7 days between
testing days. All procedures at the CNR complied with the
protocols approved by the Italian Health Ministry (Licence
no. 12/2011-C) and were performed in full accordance with the
European law on humane care and use of Laboratory animals.
The experiments performed in our study adhere to the ASAB/
ABS Guidelines for the use of Animals in Research.
Material
The apparatus consisted of a table with two strings on top of it
and was situated outside of the testing enclosure in front of a
Perspex panel that was attached to the mesh. The apes’ table was
made of 1 cm thick, black painted Perspex, (72 cm678 cm) and
the table for the capuchin monkeys was made of 0.5 cm black
painted wood (32.5 cm6 31.5 cm). The different proportions of
the tables (and other materials involved) were adjusted to the
differences in body size of apes and capuchins. We used 0.5 cm
diameter white, plastic-coated nylon strings that were 92 cm- long
for the apes, and 35 cm- long for the monkeys. The strings were
placed in front of two holes in the Perspex panel separated 36 cm
for the apes and 20 cm for the monkeys; the holes were 7 cm
diameter for the apes and 3.5 cm diameter for the monkeys. For
Figure 1. Apparatus for the ‘covered’ and the ‘uncovered’ condition. In the ‘covered’ condition, the functional parts of the strings were
covered up with a cover. The perceptually identical, but non-functional strings on the cover represented their real counterparts underneath. The
rewards could still be seen at the same distance as in the ‘uncovered’ condition. Only the object movements were obscured in the ‘covered’
condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108597.g001
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the apes, a device was attached in front of the holes that
constrained subjects to one choice at a time – if subjects moved the
device to open one hole, the other one was closed. Then the
experimenter removed the non-chosen string. Monkeys were
restricted to one choice at a time by moving the apparatus back
immediately after they started pulling one of the strings. Both apes
and monkeys had to pull the string towards themselves in order to
obtain a reward (if their choice was correct). The rewards were tied
to the further ends of the strings; these were pieces of banana,
monkey chow, or whole grapes for the apes, depending on the
individual preferences, and small peanut pieces for the monkeys.
The strings were placed on top of double-sided tape so that they
lay straight on the table. When pulled, the string would come away
from the tape easily. The gap in the non-functional option was
5 cm long for all subjects. This was done to ensure that the
salience of the gap was held constant for all nonhuman primates.
For the apes it was either close to the subject (32 cm), far from the
subject (58 cm) or in the middle of the string (45 cm). This was to
investigate the role of split-attention between the reward and the
gap. The variation in gap position had no effect on performance
(S2); therefore, it was not used for the capuchin monkeys and it is
not discussed further.
In the ‘covered’ condition, the functional parts of the strings
were obscured with a cover of the same material as the apparatus.
This cover was placed over the functional strings at a height that
just allowed the reward to pass freely beneath it and two half-
circles were cut into the cover (see fig. 1) to allow the subject to see
the rewards at the far-end of the table. Non-functional strings of
the same material and size as in the ‘uncovered’ condition were
stuck on the cover coinciding exactly with the functional strings
below.
Procedure
Half of the subjects started on the ‘covered’ and half started on
the ‘uncovered’ version of the problem. The experimenter
positioned the baited strings behind an occluder before raising it
and allowing the subject to make a choice. As soon as the subject
pulled or touched one string, the experimenter removed the other
string. Testing was interrupted if subjects refused to participate
and was continued on the next testing day. If they scored 11 or 12
correct on the first day of testing, they moved to the next
condition. If they did not, they continued to another 12 trials until
they reached the criterion of 19 out of 24 or more, or until 120
trials had been completed. In both cases, participants then moved
to the next condition. This success criterion ensured that subjects
had chosen the correct string significantly above chance (a-
level = 0.01; we ran binomial tests to calculate the p-value for 11
correct choices out of 12, p=0.006 and 19 correct choices out of
24, p=0.007) and was used for both conditions of all experiments.
For all subjects the correct choice was presented equally often on
the left and on the right side of the apparatus within a session. This
was done in a pseudorandom, pre-prescribed order, with the
restriction that no more than 2 trials on one side were given
consecutively, to discourage side biases. The percentage of correct
trials for each condition was analysed. Trials were scored live on a
coding sheet and recorded on mini DV tape.
Transfer. To exclude the possibility that apes and monkeys
preferred the longer string, we conducted an ‘uncovered’ transfer
task for successful subjects in which the correct choice was always
shorter than the first part of the broken string. A maximum of 36
trials was conducted and criterion was identical to the test-phase
(i.e. 11 or more correct choices out of 12 on the first day of testing,
and 19– or more- out of 24 thereafter).
Results
The performance of great apes and capuchin monkeys did not
differ across the two conditions in experiment 1; however, both
species performed significantly poorer in the ‘covered’ condition
compared to the ‘uncovered’ condition. In line with previous studies
[3,12–17], eight out of 12 great apes and six out of eight capuchin
monkeys quickly solved the ‘uncovered’ condition. All three species
required a similar amount of trials to reach criterion in the
‘uncovered’ condition (chimpanzees,MTrials to criterion=64; bonobos,
M Trials to criterion=75; capuchin monkeys, M Trials to criterion=80),
with no significant species differences, (F(2,18) = .36, p..05). The
proportion of correct trials for the ‘uncovered’ and ‘covered’ was
normally distributed, Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test, ‘uncovered’,
Z= .69, p..05; ‘covered’, Z= .74, p..05. Thus, the proportion of
correct trials for each individual was analysed in a mixed-model
ANOVA with condition as a within-subjects factor, and species and
order of task presentation as between-subjects factors. There was no
significant effect of species (F(2,15) = .44, p..05) nor order of task
presentation on performance (F(1,15) = .00, p..05), and no significant
interactions. However, the ANOVA revealed a significant effect of
condition on performance, (F(1,15) = 30.13, p,.01), with no signif-
icant interactions (see figure 2 and S1). All ape and monkey subjects
successfully solved the string-length transfer within 36 trials or less
(i.e. all primates reached criterion within 36 trials).
Discussion
The difference in performance between the ‘covered’ and the
‘uncovered’ conditions suggests that nonhuman primates’ ability to
choose the unbroken string is not based on simply associating the
outcome with a response to a perceptual cue. In fact, none of the
subjects solved the ‘covered’ condition, regardless of whether they
received this task first or second. Strikingly, even successful
subjects of the ‘uncovered’ first-group did not use the perceptual
information given by the cues on the cover to discriminate
between the options in the ‘covered’ condition, despite the close
perceptual similarity to the cues given in the ‘uncovered’
condition. We suggest that subjects benefitted from the combina-
tion of perceptual and functionally-relevant information when they
learned to solve the ‘uncovered’ condition. However, removing
visual access to the functional gap also restricts visual access to the
movement of the strings, and this difference in perceptual feedback
could be an alternative reason for the difference in performance.
We address this alternative in Experiment 3.
Experiment 2: Children
Participants
Children from 10 kindergartens across Leipzig were tested
between November 2008 and April 2009:12 in each of 4 age-
groups: 2 K, 3 K, 5 K and 6 K year-olds. We did not test 4 K
year-olds due to time constraints. In each age group we tested
equal numbers of boys and girls. Children were tested individually
in a small room near their classroom. Subjects were tested on
consecutive days as far as possible, with no more than 3 days
between testing days. We used a window of 2 months above and
below the target age. A further 9 children were dropped from the
study due to experimenter’s error (6) or because they did not
complete all phases of testing, either because they went on holiday
(2) or became ill (1). The study was ethically approved by an
internal committee at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary
Anthropology. There is documented informed consent from
parents/guardians.
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Material
The apparatus for the children was made of cardboard,
‘covered’ in blue sticky, backed plastic (101 cm 6 61 cm) and
placed on the floor, with the child sitting behind a 60 cm660 cm
thick Perspex window fixed to the front of it. The strings were
121 cm long white wool and lay 32 cm apart, in front of two 7 cm
diameter holes in the Perspex panel. As for the apes, a device was
attached to the front of the panel that constrained subjects to one
choice at a time. The 5 cm gap in the broken string was either
close to the subject (45 cm), far from the subject (71 cm) or in the
middle of the string (58 cm). We found a significant effect of gap
position on performance, but as our main results remained
unaffected, the latter finding is not discussed further (see S2). The
rewards were clear plastic balls containing stickers. Similar to the
apes and monkeys, in the ‘covered’ condition the functional parts
of the strings were covered with a cover of the same material as the
apparatus. Again, this cover was placed over the real strings at a
height that just allowed the reward to pass freely beneath it. Non-
functional strings were stuck on the cover with the same materials
and measures as in the ‘uncovered’ condition.
Procedure
The experimental procedure was identical to the apes and
monkeys and contained only minimal verbal instructions (i.e. ‘‘Try
to get a sticker!’’) with the only difference that children received 24
trials per day and a maximum of 48 trials per condition. The
success criterion for both conditions (‘covered’ and ‘uncovered’)
was identical to that used in experiment 1.
Results
Overall children of all age groups performed better in the
‘uncovered’ than in the ‘covered’ condition, but performance in the
‘covered’ condition improved with age (see figure 3). One of twelve
2 K year-olds, 8 of twelve 3 K year-olds (M Trials to criterion=33),
and all 5K (M Trials to criterion=22 trials) and 6K year-olds (M Trials
to criterion=18 trials) reached criterion in the ‘uncovered’ version of
the task. In contrast, only one of twelve 2K year-olds; 2 of twelve 3
K year-olds (M Trials to criterion=30 trials); 6 of twelve 5K year-olds
(M Trials to criterion=26 trials) and 7 of twelve 6K year-olds (M Trials
to criterion=26.7) reached criterion in the ‘covered’ task. The
proportion of correct trials in the ‘uncovered’ and ‘covered’
were normally distributed, Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test, ‘uncovered’,
Z=1.29, p..05; ‘covered’, Z=1.32, p..05. A mixed-model
ANOVA (with condition as a within-subjects factor, and age and
order of task presentation as between-subjects factors) on the
proportion of correct trials in children revealed a significant three-
way interaction between condition6age6order (F(3,40) = 4.83, p,
0.01) (see figure 3). A Scheffe posthoc test indicated that 5K year-
olds performed significantly better than 2 K year-olds and 3 K
year-olds, all p’s ,.01; as did 6 K year-olds, all p’s ,.01. There
were no significant differences between 5 K year-olds and 6 K
year-olds, p..05, or between 2 K year-olds and 3 K year-olds,
p..05. Thus, we collapsed the data of older children (5K year-olds
and 6K year-olds) and the data of younger children (2K year-olds
and 3 K year-olds). Looking at these two groups separately, a
mixed-model ANOVA in young children revealed a significant
effect of condition (F(1,22) = 5.1,8, p,.05) with no effect of order and
no significant interactions. In fact, similar to apes and capuchins,
most young children failed the ‘covered’ condition regardless of
Figure 2. Proportion of correct trials for chimpanzees, bonobos and capuchin monkeys in the ‘covered’ and ‘uncovered’ condition.
Dark bars represent the ‘uncovered-first’ group and light bars the ‘covered-first’ group.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108597.g002
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whether they received this condition first or second, but they
performed well in the ‘uncovered’ condition. It has to be noted,
however, that 2 K year-olds largely failed to reach criterion in
both the ‘covered’ and ‘uncovered’ condition (Figure 3 and S3).
In contrast, older children showed a significant interaction
between condition and order (F(1,22) = 15.18, p,.01), and a
significant effect of condition (F(1,22) = 42.83, p,.001). Performance
in the ‘covered’ condition was better in the group that received the
‘uncovered’ condition first (M Proportion of correct trials= .83, SD= .16)
compared to the group that received the ‘covered’ condition first
(M Proportion of correct trials= .62, SD= .15).
Discussion
The different performance in the ‘covered’ and ‘uncovered’
conditions indicates that, similar to apes and capuchins, 3K year-
old children did not learn to avoid the broken string by using only
its appearance as an arbitrary cue. Instead, learning required both
visual access and feedback related to the functional properties of
the strings. This is consistent with previous work on the
developmental trajectory of the use of object knowledge in
children. ‘Core knowledge’ accounts of infant cognitive develop-
ment posit that basic object concepts such as continuity and
solidity emerge in the first months of life [18], but immature
executive resources may prevent children from acting on their
knowledge until around 3 years of age [19]. The finding that 2K
year-old children largely failed to solve the ‘uncovered’ condition,
while most 3 K year-old children solved this condition might be
similarly accounted for.
The poor performance of the two younger age groups in the
‘covered’ condition is surprising in light of other work. Gopnik
et al [20,21] found that 2–4 year-old children were able to learn a
relationship between an arbitrary cue (blue, not red block) and an
outcome (a sound activated by the experimenter surreptitiously) in
very few trials. In our study, 3 K year-olds starting with the
‘covered’ condition did not learn to avoid the side with the gap on
the cover (arbitrary cue). However, there is a clear difference
between the tasks concerning the transparency of the mechanics
involved. While the mechanics were deliberately opaque in
Gopnik et al [20,21], they were obvious in our study (pull a string
to get a reward). It might be harder to relate an arbitrary cue with
an outcome if the mechanics of a problem are known to the
subject than if they are not. If capuchins, apes and children have
knowledge about the relevant properties involved in pulling a
string, then they might be less likely to view the perceptual cues
present in the ‘covered’ condition as relevant to the problem’s
solution.
Successful performance in the ‘covered’ version increased with
age in the children. Unlike the apes and younger children, some
5K and 6K year-olds were able to solve the ‘covered’ condition
even when they received it first, though they performed better if
they received it second. One possibility is that learning from
perceptual surface features emerges late in human development.
However, as discussed above, in other contexts 3 to 5 year-old
children can form new associations and even causal representa-
tions from perceptual cues. In addition, the fact that older age
groups performed better in the ‘covered’ condition if they received
the ‘uncovered’ condition first does not fit well with an explanation
based on improvements in associative learning of arbitrary
patterns, which would not benefit from previous experience with
the functional properties of a given task. An alternative
explanation for the developmental pattern in human children is
that with age, children are increasingly able to use the stimuli in
the covered condition as iconic symbols. Indeed, DeLoache and
colleagues found that children begin to use symbolic representa-
tions in the absence of explicit verbal instruction at a similar age
(5–7 years), albeit from a different paradigm [22].
In sum, both children of all age groups and non-human
primates performed better if the perceptual features and their
Figure 3. Proportion of correct trials for children of different age groups in the ‘covered’ and ‘uncovered’ condition. Dark bars
represent the ‘uncovered-first’ group and light bars the ‘covered-first’ group.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108597.g003
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functional context where present (‘uncovered’ condition) than if
the perceptual features were arbitrarily related to the outcome
(‘covered’ condition). However, the two conditions also differed in
the amount of visual feedback provided to the subject. In the
‘covered’ condition, once a string had been pulled the string and
the reward disappeared underneath the cover and its movement
was obscured; this reduced amount of visual feedback might have
led to poorer performance. To rule out this possibility, we
conducted a further experiment with chimpanzees and 3K -year-
olds. We could not test bonobos and capuchins because of a lack of
subjects that had not already participated in Experiment 1.
Experiment 3: Chimpanzees and Children
Subjects
We tested 6 chimpanzees (5 females) at the WKPRC (age
range = 7–15 years) and 12 3 K year-old children (6 girls) from 3
kindergartens in Leipzig. Both chimpanzees and children were
tested in September 2011. None of them had taken part in the
previous experiments described above. The chimpanzees had
previously participated in experiments involving choosing between
two tools, including those made from string. See the supplemental
materials for more information on the chimpanzees’ ages, rearing
histories and housing conditions.
Materials and procedure
The same apparatus of the original experiment was used for the
experiment for both apes and children with the only difference
that there were no cues present on the cover.
Testing was conducted according to the same experimental
procedure described in experiment 1. The crucial difference lay in
the replacement of the ‘covered’ condition with a ‘memory’
version of the broken-string problem, while the ‘uncovered’
condition remained identical. In the ‘memory’ condition partic-
ipants were shown the functional strings for 2–3 seconds, before
these were covered up by a plain cover. Thus, they had knowledge
of the strings before making a choice; however, there were no
visual cues present at the time of the choice and, similar to the
‘covered condition’ the string movement was partially obscured.
Half of the subjects started on the ‘uncovered’ condition while half
of the subjects started on the ‘memory’ condition. Scoring and
maximum amount of trials and success criterion were identical to
experiment 1 for chimpanzees and experiment 2 for children.
Results
Both children and chimpanzees solved the ‘memory’ condition
(but most subjects failed to reach criterion when it was presented
first). Four out of 6 chimpanzees reached criterion in the memory
condition (M Trials to criterion=45 trials), but only one chimpanzee
solved this condition when it was presented first. In contrast, all
chimpanzees solved the ‘uncovered’ condition (M Trials to criterion=
36 trials). Seven out of 12 children reached criterion in the
‘memory’ condition (M Trials to criterion=27.4 trials), but only one
child solved this condition when it was presented first. Six out of 12
children solved the ‘uncovered’ condition if it was presented first
(M Trials to criterion=20 trials), and one child solved it when it was
presented second. The proportion of correct trials for the
‘uncovered’ and the ‘memory’ condition were normally distributed
for both chimpanzees (Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test, ‘uncovered’,
Z= .54, p..05; ‘memory’, Z= .69, p..05) and children (Kolmo-
gorov-Smirnov-test, ‘uncovered’, Z= .63, p..05; ‘memory’,
Z= .49, p..05). A mixed-model ANOVA on the proportion of
correct trials (with condition as a within-subjects factor, and
species and order of task presentation as between-subjects factors)
revealed a significant interaction of condition and order of task
presentation (F(1,14) = 19.92, p,.01) and a significant effect of order
(F(1,4) = 8.06, p,.05), but no other main effects. A Bonferroni
pairwise comparison showed that subjects who received the
‘uncovered’ condition before the ‘memory’ condition performed
better in the ‘memory’ condition (M Proportion of correct trials= .88,
SE= .04) than subjects who received the ‘memory’ condition first
(M Proportion of correct trials= .53, SE= .04) (see S4 for individual
performance).
Discussion
Both chimpanzees and 3 K year-olds who received the
‘uncovered’ condition first performed better than subjects starting
with the ‘memory’ condition. In fact, only one chimpanzee and
one 3 K year-old solved the ‘memory’ condition when it was
presented first. This order effect indicates that visual feedback
(unrestricted in the ‘uncovered’ condition) played a role in the
solution of the broken-string problem. This is not surprising in
light of recent work showing the importance of visual feedback for
the acquisition of a new solution in chimpanzees [23]. Neverthe-
less, poorer performance in the ‘covered’ condition of experiment
1 compared to the ‘uncovered’ condition cannot be solely
ascribable to the fact that the movement of the real strings was
obscured from view. Both apes and 3 K year-olds solved the
‘memory’ condition (particularly, if they received it second), which
has similarly reduced visual feedback. One could argue that in the
‘uncovered’ condition subjects had learned to associate the string
without a gap with the reward and they might have transferred this
association in the ‘memory’ condition without understanding the
functional properties involved. However, if this was the case why
would subjects have been capable to transfer this association to the
‘memory’ condition in experiment 3, but not to the ‘covered’
condition in experiment 1? The only difference between the
‘covered’ and the ‘memory’ condition was the visual access to the
functional parts of the strings before being covered up in the
‘memory’ condition. Thus, the functional information present in
the ‘memory’ condition and in the ‘uncovered’ condition seems to
have been crucial for success. Future studies should investigate the
role of visual feedback on the performance of capuchins and
bonobos in the two versions of the broken-string problem.
General Discussion
Penn et al [24] have suggested that representing higher-order
abstract concepts is a uniquely human ability (but see [25,26]);
however, the difference between human and nonhuman primates
might not be that simple. The difference may lie in symbolic
relationships in particular, rather than abstract concepts in general
[11]. Our study suggests that perceptually-based heuristics are not
a good candidate explanation for the ability of non-human
primates to avoid a broken tool: they perform poorly when
perceptual cues are stripped of their functional relevance, implying
that they make use of the functionally-relevant information about
object properties. Chimpanzees, bonobos and capuchin monkeys
may be able to conceptualize object features that transcend
perceptual commonalities if they are grounded in functional
contexts.
Chimpanzees and 3 K year-olds could use the functional cues
to solve the ‘memory’ task despite restricted visual feedback, but
performance was better if they first had received the ‘uncovered’
condition in which both functional information and full perceptual
access to the object movement was provided. This might reflect
the fact that finding new solutions to physical problems involves
not only background knowledge about object properties, but also
Abstract Knowledge in the Broken-String Problem
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an ability to use that information to predict how an object will
behave when acted upon. The latter skill is important if feedback is
restricted, as in our memory task, or if the problem is ‘ill-
structured’ (i.e. rather than choosing between two pre-determined
alternatives, a new action sequence needs to be produced, such as
manufacturing a hooked tool). Finding an innovative solution to a
new problem is something that chimpanzees and even older
children find difficult: this need not imply that they lack the
requisite object knowledge; but precisely what cognitive skills are
involved is an unanswered question (see [27]; [28] for a review).
Future research should explore how pre-existing representations of
objects and their properties interact with online perceptual
feedback from acting on those objects when tackling a new
physical problem.
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